A few weeks after the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5, leading to Türkiye’s participation in NATO missions in Afghanistan, such as r unning   the   Kabul   International   Airport and   assuming   leadership   of   ISAF   (International Security    Assistance    Force) . Shortly before the start of the Iraq war in 2003, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), which defined itself as a moderate Islamic party, assumed power in Türkiye. This was a golden opportunity for the United States to secure the support of a conservative but moderate government in Türkiye since doing so would enhance the legitimacy of the military intervention in Iraq. The United States requested Türkiye’s permission for the deployment of thousands of U.S. forces in Turkish territory and the opening of Turkish airspace, several Turkish ports, and airports to U.S. air and navy forces. Although the JDP government had a majority in the parliament and supported U.S. demands, parliamentary members did not listen to the leadership of the party, so the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) rejected the plea. That was a turning point in U.S.-Türkiye relations. The United States was so sure that the authorization would pass, it already sent its fleet to the port of Iskenderun . The huge disappointment soon turned into a retaliation. On July 4, 2003, a group of Turkish soldiers operating in Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq were taken into custody by U.S. forces in collaboration with Kurdish militias. While they were being transferred, hoods were placed over their heads as a further humiliation. The United States acted upon intelligence provided by local Kurdish forces that claimed Turkish forces aimed to destabilize Kirkuk so that Türkiye could intervene militarily. Referred to as “the hood incident” among the Turkish population, the event fueled anti-Americanism in Türkiye. Besides its symbolic effect, the incident revealed an important shift in the U.S. strategic paradigm: The United States chose to trust its Kurdish allies rather than Türkiye. The establishment of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in 2005 irritated Türkiye, which has been dealing with Kurdish separatism for nearly four decades. The rumor that the main aim of U.S. military presence in the Middle East is to dismantle regional states circulated among ultra- nationalist cadres in Türkiye. According to these views, the United States intervened in the Middle East and destroyed state structures in the region to create a secure environment for Israel. Ultra-nationalist groups believed the time would soon come for Türkiye. The promulgation of the document “ G-8    Plan    of    Support    for Reform ,” which proposed the democratization and economic liberalism for the Middle East, was presented as the proof of this grand conspiracy. The same groups also sought the violent overthrow of the JDP government, which they perceived as complicit with U.S. plans. Although they were unsuccessful in their attempts to replace the government, their propaganda spread anti-Americanism among the public. The start of the civil war in Syria in 2011 deteriorated already damaged U.S.-Türkiye relations. Initially, Türkiye hoped U.S.-led NATO forces would intervene in Syria to topple Bashar al-Assad as they did to Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. However, the expected military intervention did not occur. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) shifted priorities from deposing Assad to eradicating the extremist group. The United States chose the Syrian Democratic Forces, mainly composed of YPG, which Türkiye considers as a Syrian branch of the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK, as a principal ally in the fight against ISIL. This has created an enduring problem between the United States and Türkiye. Türkiye considers the YPG and PKK as the same terrorist organizations whose goal is to set up a Marxist Kurdish state in Turkish territory. The terrorist statelet in northern Syria is considered as the first step for this goal. Türkiye also worried that a YPG army is being created through U.S. military and financial support. Turkish policymakers are convinced that this army will be used against Türkiye in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Türkiye launched military offensives against YPG despite U.S. objections: Operation Euphrates Shield (2016- 2017), a campaign primarily targeting ISIL but also utilized as a preemptive strike to prevent the YPG from establishing a corridor; Operation Olive Branch (2018), a campaign directly attacking YPG in Afrin (northwest Syria); and Operation Peace Spring (2019), which created a cordon sanitaire in northern Syria to keep the YPG from the Turkish border. Despite President Trump’s promise to withdraw American soldiers from northern Syria, approximately 2,000 American    troops    remained in the area. The presence of about 900   U.S.   troops   in   northern Syria (as of July 2023) prevents Türkiye from launching a decisive military operation which would eradicate YPG elements completely. These external problems coincided with internal problems in Türkiye. Fethullah Gülen, who has taken residence in the United States since 1999, and whose sympathizers had been infiltrating the judiciary, police and military forces since the 1980s, turned into President Erdoğan’s most ardent enemy. On July 15, 2016, he initiated   a coup against the JDP government. The coup was thwarted and Gülen became public enemy number one. The Turkish government’s repeated calls for the extradition of Gülen have thus far been ignored. Some in the Turkish government and public view this as an indication of U.S. support for the coup attempt because Türkiye was against American plans in the Middle East. As a result, the Turkish government has pivoted away from pro-U.S. policies and has increasingly become closer to Russia and China. For example, Türkiye has formed a close military cooperation with Russia, such as purchasing the S-400 missile system from Russia despite U.S. sanctions. The purchase led to Türkiye’s exclusion from the F-35 joint strike fighter program since the systems of the F-35 and S-400 are deemed incompatible. President Erdoğan has even threatened to leave NATO and join     the     Shanghai     Cooperation Organization . The extent of Türkiye’s relationship with China and Russia in the post-9/11 era remains to be seen. But what is clear is the United States’ Kurdish-friendly policies in Iraq and Syria, as well as its refusal to extradite Gülen, have transformed a strategic partnership among NATO allies to one of strategic divergence, making it one of the most enduring legacies of the Global War on Terror in American-Turkish relations.

Written by

Gökhan Tekir