One of the legacies of September 11th was the imperative to develop locally stricter counterterrorism measures, even in countries historically not known for attacks, such as those in Latin America. For example, Brazil approved Law No. 13,260 in March 2016, known as the Brazilian Antiterrorism Law, which criminalizes terrorism and its financing. What are the origins, logics, and instrumentalization of this law and why should it be considered one of the lasting legacies of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Brazil? After the attacks on 9/11, the U.S. government structured the Global War on Terror based on three pillars: military operations abroad, measures to protect national territory, and global actions involving diplomatic, intelligence, surveillance, and legal efforts against terrorism. This logic prompted countries around the world to adopt stricter counterterrorism measures and encourage the development of their own antiterrorism legislation. In Latin America, the incorporation of antiterrorism laws became a defining feature of efforts to enhance domestic security. The urgent idea of combating terrorism was accompanied by the imperative to expand regulatory frameworks, increase budget allocations, and bolster the power and authority of local institutions. A notable demonstration of this endeavor was the organization of the “Illicit Financial Crimes’’ conference in October 2009, held in Rio de Janeiro, a joint initiative led by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism in partnership with the Brazilian government. According to WikiLeaks , the event gathered state and federal judges, thirty prosecutors, and over fifty federal police agents, along with representatives from various Latin American countries (Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay). It served as a bilateral training project, wherein Brazilian law enforcement and justice agencies received training from their U.S. counterparts. Promoting antiterrorism laws in Latin America may seem contradictory or even unnecessary at first glance, since countries like Brazil have been historically untouched by terrorist groups. However, the ability of the United States to extend global counterterrorism efforts in allied countries in Latin America has historical precedents. Brazil, for example, has a history of replicating security policies initially developed by the United States, as seen with the adoption of the Zero   Tolerance   Policy , the Detecta Security System , and t he “war on drugs” policies . In Brazilian legislation, the term “terrorism” first appeared in the 1983 National   Security   Law   (Law 7,170) , a remnant of the military dictatorship that criminalized acts (such as political dissent or affiliation with clandestine or subversive political organizations) as terrorism. Besides representing an imprecise classification of the term “terrorism,” it was a    clear    violation    of    the principle     of legality and specificity, or the constitutional exhaustive principle . The replacement of the National Security Law only occurred in 2016, during Dilma Rousseff's government, coinciding with Rio    de    Janeiro’s hosting   of   the   Summer   Olympic   Games . Given the global significance of the event, there were concerns about the potential targeting of the city or participating delegations, reminiscent of the tragic 1972 Munich Olympics attack. Furthermore, this period witnessed a surge in terrorist attacks worldwide, with over 16,900 attacks in 2014 and 14,900 in 2015, as documented by the Global Terrorism Database . Under these circumstances, the Brazilian government faced considerable pressure from other countries and international entities to pass specific legislation against terrorism, lest delegations opt to boycott the event. Consequently, the approval of the Antiterrorism Law in 2016 was expedited and received widespread support in Congress. However, the Rio Olympic Games is not the sole reason why the Antiterrorism Law was swiftly approved. Instead, the proposal presented to the Brazilian Congress was championed by then- Minister of Justice, José Eduardo Cardoso, and Minister of Finance, Joaquim Levy. This leadership pointed out that Brazil had been facing continuous international pressure, particularly from the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), an intergovernmental body dedicated to combating financial crimes, including money laundering and terrorist financing. This pressure played a significant role in expediting the passage of the law. The urgency to approve new national legislation to criminalize terrorism and its financing in Brazil was highlighted in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Report released  in June 2010 . The report emphasized the need for such legislation, signaling the importance of complying with international standards to prevent possible sanctions or blacklisting. The Ministry of Finance’s efforts to pass the Antiterrorism Law were aimed at aligning Brazil with global norms and avoiding potential consequences, such as heightened scrutiny on financial transactions by international institutions. Failure to comply could have imposed costs and limitations on the country’s economy. At the same time, in the early 2010s Brazil was facing an economic crisis and eager to demonstrate itself as a secure destination for foreign investments. From the perspective of policymakers, Brazil’s adoption of an Antiterrorism Law could be explained by the need to ensure public and athlete safety   during the   Olympic   Games , but it is also related to the logic of seeking improvements for the country’s weakened economic environment. This intriguing approval process suggests that combating terrorism in Brazil held not only law enforcement significance, but also carried essential economic implications. The law’s adoption signified Brazil’s commitment to international standards and demonstrated a willingness to address global concerns, which bolstered its image as a safe and reliable place to conduct business and attract foreign investments. Thus, the legitimacy of Brazil’s antiterrorism efforts extends beyond mere security considerations and is intertwined with a significant economic rationale. The adoption of the Antiterrorism Law in Brazil divided opinions. Some argued it was an attempt by the legal system to maintain a clearer definition of terrorism. Moreover, the possibility of terrorist attacks occurring on Brazilian soil was considered based on the following factors: (a) the diversity and reach inherent to terrorist groups and networks and their various motivations; (b) a lone wolf act, possible at any location; (c) the local presence of foreign institutions that could be targeted; (d) the assumption that terrorists are not always located in the same places that are frequently affected by them; and (e) Brazil’s expanding role in the global international order. In addition, the adoption of mechanisms proposed by the counterterrorism international regime reinforced Brazil’s efforts in fighting transnational organized crime, which has always been a priority in the national agenda. However, the Brazilian Antiterrorism Law has faced several critics. Some argue that Brazil does not face major terrorism threats that would justify such legislation. Further criticism stems from the lack of clarity in defining what constitutes a terrorist act within Brazil. When the law reached the presidency, it was sanctioned with eight vetoes referring to provisions such as classifying vandalism and sabotage of transport, property, or computer systems as terrorism. According to the Executive, the definitions were “excessively broad and imprecise.” However, the vetoed qualifications do not preclude the possibility of prosecuting certain acts under the law. Thus, the final text retained the broad and vague nature that could allow instrumentalization against specific social groups. While the amendments introduced some restrictions, the law remains flexible enough to potentially target political opponents or regime critics rather than bonafide terrorism. According to Law No. 13,260/2016 : Thus, the final text of the Brazilian   Antiterrorism Law   is   so   vague   and   broad   that legitimate social movements advocating for human rights and social causes, such as indigenous,    quilombola , environmental, and labor movements could be accused     of     terrorism . Examples include the Landless Movement ( Movimento    Sem    Terra    - MST ), the Homeless Workers’ Movement ( Movimento     dos     Trabalhadores     Sem     Teto     - MTST ), or even more diffuse social groups that have aggressively protested against the state, as was   the   case   of   the   Black   Blocs   in   June   2013 . The difficulty in characterizing an attack as terrorism leads us to reflect on the convenience of adopting a law that has various ambiguities and loopholes, as these social movements could be delegitimized and criminalized simply for being critical of certain governments or specific policies. In the final analysis, the 2016 Brazilian Antiterrorism Law is primarily a result of international pressure coming from a historically influential partner: the United States. Similarly, the process of approving the law can be seen as part of a project for Brazil’s international integration, aiming to strengthen economic ties with developed countries and align the country with global norms of good governance. Ultimately, it could also be a strategically convenient instrument for the criminalization of social practices typical of civil resistance groups in Brazilian society.